


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3. THE THREE OF US BELIEVE STRONGLY THAT ANY ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS BEING WORKED IN WASHINGTON SHOULD MAINTAIN THE LONGSTANDING U.S. POSITION THAT AN INF AGREEMENT AND A START AGREEMENT CAN BE CONCLUDED AND IMPLEMENTED SEPARATELY FROM DEFENSE AND SPACE ISSUES. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL WITH REGARD TO THE ABM TREATY IS LINKED TO THE ELIMINATION OF "OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES" BUT WE BELIEVE THAT THIS CONCEPT CAN BE IMPLEMENTED IN A WAY WHICH MINIMIZES THE ABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION TO ARGUE THAT WE HAVE THUS NOW AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO LINK INF AND START TO SDI AS PART OF A "PACKAGE DEAL".

4. AS WASHINGTON IS AWARE, THE SOVIETS HAVE APPARENTLY BACKTRACKED ON THEIR PREVIOUS AGREEMENT TO DEAL WITH INF SEPARATELY FROM STRATEGIC AND DEFENSE/SPACE ISSUES. THEY NOW ARGUE THAT THEIR INF OFFER IS AN INSEPARABLE PART OF THE REYKJAVIK PACKAGE. THE U.S. NEEDS TO MAINTAIN ITS STRONG POSITION THAT IT IS THE SOVIETS ALONE WHO ARE HOLDING AN INF AGREEMENT HOSTAGE TO OTHER ISSUES.

5. FOR THIS REASON WE BELIEVE THAT, ON INF THE U.S. SHOULD AVOID FORMULATING ITS CONCEPT OF A PACKAGE DEAL IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD INCLUDE AND THUS LINK THE CURRENT INF NEGOTIATIONS AS PART OF THE PACKAGE. THE INSTRUCTIONS JUST RECEIVED (REFTELS) ARE NOT TOTALLY CONSISTENT ON THIS POINT. THE OVERALL INSTRUCTIONS REJECT SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO HOLD PROGRESS IN ONE NEGOTIATING FORUM HOSTAGE TO PROGRESS IN ANOTHER AND PRESS FOR A SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT. PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE DEFENSE/SPACE INSTRUCTIONS, HOWEVER, STATES THAT "THE

ADDITIONAL COMMITMENTS INCLUDED IN THE PROPOSALS TABLED BY THE U.S. (I.E. INCLUDING A 10-YEAR ABM TREATY COMMITMENT) WERE STRICTLY CONDITIONED ON THE TWO SIDES

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REACHING A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT NOW ON A  
SCHEDULE OF REDUCTIONS RESULTING IN 50 PERCENT  
REDUCTIONS IN THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES OF BOTH  
SIDES TO EQUAL LEVELS BY 1991 AND TOTAL ELIMINATION OF  
THE OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES OF BOTH SIDES BY 1996."

6. WITH RESPECT TO INF, THE LATTER PART OF THE ABOVE  
"IF ASKED" FORMULATION WOULD, AS STATED, INCLUDE INF  
MISSILES, BOTH LRINF AND SRINF. IT WOULD THUS RESULT IN  
THE US ITSELF FOR THE FIRST TIME ESTABLISHING A LINK  
BETWEEN INF AND SDI BY REQUIRING THAT THE SOVIETS ACCEPT  
ELIMINATION OF INF BALLISTIC MISSILES (ALONG WITH  
STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES) AS PART OF A PACKAGE IN  
WHICH WE OFFER THE 10-YEAR ABM TREATY COMMITMENT. SUCH  
A STEP ON OUR PART WOULD GRAVELY UNDERMINE IF NOT  
DESTROY OUR FUNDAMENTAL ARGUMENT THAT THERE IS NO LOGIC  
TO THE SOVIET POSITION THAT AN INF AGREEMENT CANNOT BE  
CONCLUDED AND IMPLEMENTED SEPARATELY FROM DEFENSE AND  
SPACE AND START ISSUES BECAUSE WE OURSELVES WOULD NOW BE  
MAKING SUCH A LINK.

7. THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO THE NATION OCTOBER 13  
REFERRED TO THE U.S. PROPOSAL THAT DURING THE SECOND  
FIVE YEARS BOTH SIDES WOULD ELIMINATE ALL REMAINING  
OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES "OF ALL RANGES." WE

BELIEVE THAT, WITH RESPECT TO INF BALLISTIC MISSILES,  
THIS PART OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL CAN AND SHOULD BE PURSUED  
IN THE INF FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS WHICH THE U.S. ALSO  
PROPOSED IN REYKJAVIK. THUS THE GOAL OF ELIMINATING  
SUCH MISSILES BY 1996 COULD REMAIN VERY MUCH A PART OF  
THE U.S. POSITION EVEN IF IT IS HANDLED SEPARATELY IN  
INF. THAT IS, THE CURRENT INF NEGOTIATION IS SEPARATE

AND TOTALLY DE-LINKED FROM DEFENSE AND SPACE ISSUES.  
HOWEVER, AS REGARDS NEGOTIATING THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF  
BALLISTIC MISSILES, WE WILL AT SOME POINT HAVE TO

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ADDRESS WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE ANY LINKAGE BETWEEN THE  
INF ASPECT OF THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES  
(WHICH IN ANY EVENT SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED SEPARATELY) AND  
OUR PROPOSAL NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY FOR AN  
ADDITIONAL FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE INITIAL FIVE-YEAR  
NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD.

8. IN SUM, TO LINK INF WITH OUR ABM TREATY OFFER, WOULD  
NEGATE OUR EFFORTS TO HOLD THE SOVIETS ACCOUNTABLE BOTH  
IN GENEVA AND PUBLICLY CONCERNING THEIR PREVIOUS  
ASSURANCES RE A SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT, A POINT ON WHICH  
THEY ARE NOW ON VERY WEAK GROUND. THE ULTIMATE RESULT  
OF OUR LINKING THE CURRENT INF NEGOTIATIONS TO SDI COULD  
BE TO GIVE THE SOVIETS AN ARGUMENT WITH WHICH TO  
PERSUADE EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AUDIENCES THAT THE PROXIMATE  
CAUSE OF OUR NOT GETTING A SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT WAS  
NOT SOVIET WELCHING ON A COMMITMENT, BUT U.S. LINKAGE OF  
SDI TO INF.

9. ACTION RECOMMENDED: THE GUIDANCE IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF  
THE DEFENSE AND SPACE INSTRUCTIONS, SHOULD CLEARLY  
DISASSOCIATE INF FROM ANY LINKAGE TO THE SDI/ABM TREATY  
ISSUE. FURTHERMORE, IN DEVELOPING ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE  
ON THE SECOND FIVE YEARS OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM FOR  
NUCLEAR REDUCTION, WE SUGGEST THAT THE US FORMULATION  
MAKE CLEAR THAT INF MISSILES ARE COVERED IN THE  
COMMITMENT TO REDUCE AND ELIMINATE ALL BALLISTIC  
MISSILES IN 10 YEARS, BUT THAT NEGOTIATION OF INF  
AGREEMENTS TO THAT END WOULD PROCEED SEPARATELY WITHOUT  
ANY LINKAGE TO THE RESOLUTION OF DEFENSE AND SPACE

QUESTIONS.

10. FOR START, A SIMILAR PROBLEM EXISTS ALTHOUGH HERE  
THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT AGREED TO DELINKAGE AND THE  
INTERRELATIONSHIP IS MORE OBVIOUS. THE PREVIOUS  
FORMULATION, THAT THE PRESIDENT'S D&S OFFER "WOULD MAKE

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NO SENSE EXCEPT IN THE CONTEXT OF DEEP REDUCTIONS" WAS HELPFUL, BUT IS NOW OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS. OBVIOUSLY, WHILE WE DO NOT WANT TO SAY THAT START IS CONTINGENT ON D&S, WE WANT TO SAY THAT THE D&S OFFER IS CONTINGENT ON 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS TREATY AND ALSO CONTINGENT UPON AGREEMENT WITHIN FIVE YEARS TO ANOTHER TREATY OR OTHER TREATIES WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR THE ELIMINATION OF REMAINING OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES. THE KEY TO HAVING OUR WAY IS TO PROVIDE START INSTRUCTIONS WHICH PLACE PRIMARY EMPHASIS ON A FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTION PROPOSAL WHICH CAN BE AGREED TO SEPARATELY FROM D&S AND ALSO EVENTUALLY A STRAIGHTFORWARD START PROPOSAL FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ICBMS AND SLBMS, WHICH ALSO COULD BE AGREED TO INDEPENDENTLY OF ANY RESOLUTION OF D&S. THIS WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY INSTRUCTIONS NOT ONLY TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THESE PROPOSALS COULD BE AGREED TO INDEPENDENTLY OF D&S BUT ALSO THAT THE DELEGATION SHOULD STRESS THAT THE INTERRELATIONSHIP IS SUCH THAT START SHOULD NOT, REPEAT NOT, BE CONTINGENT ON D&S, ALTHOUGH ONE PARTICULAR D&S OFFER OBVIOUSLY REQUIRES REDUCTIONS AND ELIMINATION OF ICBMS AND SLBMS.

11. START SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED THAT OUR FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTION PROPOSAL AND OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ICBMS AND SLBMS COULD BE AGREED TO NOW TOGETHER AS A PACKAGE OR WE WOULD AGREE TO A TREATY ON FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTIONS FIRST AND LATER A TREATY PROVIDING FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ICBMS AND SLBMS. OUR PROPOSAL SHOULD PROVIDE FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ICBMS AND SLBMS BY 1996, BUT SHOULD NOT BE LINKED TO THE D&S OFFER. RATHER, THE

US SHOULD CONTINUE TO REFUTE VIGOROUSLY ANY NOTION THAT EITHER OF THESE PROPOSALS SHOULD BE MADE CONTINGENT ON AN AGREEMENT ON D&S.

12. D&S SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED, WITH RESPECT TO START, TO PRESENT THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER AND STATE THAT THE US

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WOULD BE WILLING TO CONCLUDE A D&S TREATY, BASED UPON  
THE US PROPOSAL, BUT THAT RATIFICATION COULD NOT TAKE  
PLACE UNTIL A START TREATY PROVIDING FOR 50 PERCENT  
REDUCTIONS WAS ALSO AGREED TO AND IMPLEMENTED AND COULD  
NOT CONTINUE AFTER 1991 UNLESS THERE HAD BEEN THE  
ACHIEVEMENT OF 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS BY 1991 AND ALSO  
AGREEMENT BY 1991 EITHER IN THE ORIGINAL START TREATY OR  
IN A NEW, RATIFIED START TREATY TO A SCHEDULE FOR THE  
ELIMINATION OF ICBMS AND SLBMS.  
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